The KLO can hardly die. The outlawed Ulfa –a strategic partner of the KLO – will never let it die in its own interest, writes BAPPADITYA PAUL.
In a span of five months –from October to February – North Bengal has so far witnessed three bomb blasts. Of these, two went off at separate railway stations, while one explosion took place in a market place along the Assam – Bengal border. The toll stands at eight dead, besides a long list of injured.
If these are any indications, and there is every reason to fear so, a tumultuous time is set to disturb peace in the region again.
It’s not the first occasion that militants threatened peace here. Due to its proximity with Assam – the state fighting insurgency for the past 25 years – North Bengal has always been prone to militants’ attacks. The vulnerability is increased as the region shares three international boundaries with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
The latter of the three is the breeding ground for militants active in the North –east.
The Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), a local militant outfit spearheading the agitation for a separate homeland for the Rajbanshis of North Bengal and four lower Assam districts, had unleashed a massive spate of violence here in the past. Until 2003, when Bhutan carried out Operation Flush Out against Indian militants camping on its soil, the KLO used to occupy the imagination of the state police.
After Operation Flush Out became an overwhelming success, followed by large-scale surrender of KLO rebels, the state police retracted from the offensive.
The feeling that the “KLO backbone had been reduced to dust” soon overcast the intelligence of the state police and it apparently moved its attention away from the outfit. While doing so, the state police missed out on the vital point that despite its backbone having been smashed, the KLO could hardly die this way. Leave aside the ideological motivation behind the outfit, the outlawed United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa) – a strategic partner of the KLO – would never let it die, for its own cause.
To put it in the proper perspective, Ulfa needs a dependable alliance in this part of West Bengal to provide its cadres with all the logistical support it needs, while accessing the camps in the neighbouring countries using the North Bengal corridor. And for this job, none could be more suitable than the KLO, which itself is waging a “proxy war” against the state.
Taking advantage of the lackadaisical attitude of the police, the KLO has once again rejuvenated itself. Intelligence reports suggest, trained in Chittagong camps, a new-armed group of the KLO crossed over to North Bengal in the middle of last year.
Apropos of the Intelligence input, a renewed spate of violence has struck North Bengal again. Worst this time, the militants seem to be following a “minimal risk, maximum achievement “ strategy and instead of confronting he security personnel directly, are targeting public zones. The blasts at Belakoba and Kamakhyaguri railway stations and at Barovisha market are only a testimony to that.
It is astonishing that even after repeated attacks on ordinary citizens, the state government, or more particularly, the state police, prefer sitting idle on the matter. The fact that militants are carrying out blasts one after another in North Bengal indicates that the guardians of law are either taking the resurgence of militants too lightly, or are missing out in strategy to tackle the situation.
The need of the hour is that the police, without any further delay, should chalk out a comprehensive strategy to foil the militant resurgence in the region.
While the intelligence machinery of the police here must undergo a massive revamp by inducing officers with proven track records, coordination with Intelligence wings of various Central security agencies would be of help.
An operational understanding and exchange of Intelligence inputs with the Assam police is called for. This is not merely because Assam shares its boundaries with North Bengal or it is an old patient afflicted by the malady of insurgency, but also because the KLO has proven links with several rebel groups active in the Northeast, including Ulfa.
On the operational aspect, instead playing it defensive, the police must go on the offensive, as it’s the only option to battle a “proxy war”, if not winning it. For this, the strength of the police force in North Bengal requires to be raised immediately to a sufficient level, without any compromise. At the same time, the police here need an aggressive and efficient political leadership to carry forward its march against militancy in the region.
And as soon as an offensive against the armed rebels is resorted to, if at all, unlike the post Operation Flush Out period, it will have to be sustained. At least until the time a better option is worked out, or the cancer of insurgency is treated at its roots.
(The author is on the staff of The Statesman, Siliguri, India / This article was originally published in The Statesman in February 2007)
